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InTroDuCTIon 
The Internet was not built with embedded security and privacy infrastruc-
tures. Instead, its framers favored a “procrastination principle”1 of allowing 
others to develop these features as they were needed, and then, specific to 
a particular application rather than network-wide. In large part because of 
the flexibility of a network that does not have extensive security and privacy 
frameworks, the Internet is now used by over a billion people worldwide.2 
E-commerce is a major component of Internet use, with $31.5 billion in U.S. 
retail sales over the Internet in the first quarter of 2007.3 Sales topped £10 
billion in the first quarter of 2007 in the United Kingdom.4 Online banking 
customers increased to 53 million in the U.S. in 2005, including 44% of 
Internet users at that time.5 In Australia, 68% of Internet users bank online at 
least once a week.6 Thirteen million Americans made donations online after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005,7 and half of all American donations to 
the 2005 Tsunami relief effort were made online.8 The upsweep of non-profit 
organizations’ presence online allows for greater online giving, from making 
donations to traditional organizations to using innovative online-loan sites 
such as prosper.com and microfinance site kiva.org.
1   Jonathan Zittrain, Th e  Fu T u r e  o F  T h e  In T e r n e T  – a n d  ho w  T o ST o p  IT (forthcoming, Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2008).
2   CIA World Factbook, Internet Users Ranked by Country, https://www.cia.gov/library/pub-
lications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2153rank.html (last updated 18 October 2007).
3   U.S. Census Bureau Department of Commerce, Quarterly Retail E-Commerce Sales: 1st 
Quarter 2007, Press Release, May 16, 2007, http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/
html/07Q1.html. 
4   Extrapolated from Tash Shifrin, UK online shopping sales hit £100 billion mark, May 21, 
2007, http://www.macworld.co.uk/news/index.cfm?RSS&newsID=18080.
5   Online Banking 2005: A Pew Internet Project Data Memo, February 8, 2005, http://www.
pewinternet.org/PPF/r/149/report_display.asp.
6   AC Nielsen, Aussie consumers choose Internet banking over ATM, phone and branch, 
April 26, 2007, http://au.acnielsen.com/site/InternetBanking.shtml.
7   Stephen Morris and John Horrigan, 13 million Americans made donations online after 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, November 24, 2005, http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/
r/168/report_display.asp.
8   Bill Clinton, speech to the Harvard University class of 2007, June 3, 2007, available at 
http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2007/06.14/99-gates.html.2 i n t r o d u c t i o n
E-commerce is, of course, only the most prominent part of a story that im-
plicates security and privacy. Facebook, a leading social networking site, had 
34 million users as of August 2007, with 200,000 new users joining each day. 
At this rate, there will be well over 60 million Facebook users by the end of 
2007.9 Increasingly, individuals rely on the Internet as a vehicle for receiving 
news – in one study, 19% of people aged 18-24 from around the world saw 
the Internet as the most important source of news.10 As we move more of 
our lives online, issues surrounding identity and identification online become 
more complex, and more important – yet our methods of assuring identity 
remain uneven and application-specific.
The extent to which so many daily activities are now carried out over the 
Internet has introduced an emerging set of concerns over one’s digital iden-
tity. Every time we enter credit card information into a Web site to make a 
purchase, type in our demographic details or music preferences, or log in to 
a Web site to book travel arrangements, we are divulging personal informa-
tion. Such personal information is usually kept solely by the services we use 
and is not transferable from one service to another. While this can prevent a 
“Fort Knox” problem, in which the compromise of one’s identity affects all of 
one’s Internet activities because one repository contains all of one’s identifying 
information, there is a corresponding problem of managing and safeguarding 
one’s identity across disparate applications and uses.
Because identity is managed one application at a time, the Internet allows 
ample space for anonymity and pseudonymity. A given application need only 
refrain from requesting and authenticating identifying information from its 
users to enable users to remain either anonymous or pseudonymous. In many 
cases, this anonymity empowers users and inspires them to share new ideas. 
At the same time, the ability to verify one’s identity on the Internet, or at 
least to establish persistent pseudonyms that can achieve reputation in repeat 
transactions, is essential for certain online exchanges. These activities include 
9    See Nicole Maestri, Wal-Mart using Facebook to win back-to-school sales,  August 8, 
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idUSN0843464220070809; see also 
Facebook Statistics, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited 5 
November 2007).
10   Research firm Globespan questioned 10,000 people in the UK, US, Brazil, Egypt, Ger-
many, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, and South Korea between March and April 2006. 
See Alfred Hermida, Young challenge mainstream media, May 3, 2006, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/technology/4962794.stm.c a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 3
buying, selling, banking, participating in certain community groups, and col-
laborating on projects. Individuals’ ability to accurately and easily share iden-
tifying information about themselves – and learn that of others – is key to the 
continued transactional success of the Internet.
The absence of such verified identity is a challenge for basic applications such 
as email, where we often cannot be certain with whom we are communicat-
ing. The question of how best to share or ascertain necessary identifying in-
formation securely while protecting users’ privacy has come to the fore. This 
question has intrigued major players in technology, and it has begun to bring 
many of them together in collaboration. 
The services we use today are cobbled together and insecure partly because 
of a lack of good methods for authentication and accreditation. These short-
comings have precluded certain types of innovation that might have occurred 
were these capabilities in existence. A major question in addressing these 
problems is that of interoperability: the ability to maintain an interconnected 
identity framework that permits credentials from one application to be read-
ily honored by another.
This case study addresses the issue of Digital ID interoperability, specifically in 
the Internet context. First, we undertake to define Digital ID interoperability 
by specifying some of its attributes, thereby arriving at a working definition. 
In Part 1.2, we consider experiences in creating Digital ID interoperability to 
date and in Part 1.3, we look at some of the forces that drive or inhibit the 
emergence of interoperability in Digital ID. In Part 2, we assess the benefits 
and drawbacks of Digital ID interoperability as they relate to innovation, 
and in Part 3 we discuss some potential paths forward. We find that while 
mechanisms for technical interoperability have been developed, there remain 
significant additional barriers to interoperability. In particular, the continued 
ability and willingness of relevant people and companies to work together on 
technology and marketing will be crucial to the uptake of an interoperable 
Digital ID system.  Such interoperability will most likely spur innovation as 
widely used Digital ID solutions enable new applications, as long as issues 
such as privacy and security will have to be adequately addressed.4 i n t r o d u c t i o nc a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 5
STaTe of Play: DIgITal  1
ID InTeroPerabIlITy
What is digital Id Interoperability? 1.1 
A definition of “Digital ID Interoperability” relies on a definition of “Digital 
ID,” which is more abstract than personal identity, and as such is more dif-
ficult to describe. Identity begins with an assertion (explicit or implicit) that 
one is a certain person or has a certain characteristic, and is not someone 
else with other characteristics (authentication). It is relational, including that 
which a person says about herself and that which others say about that person 
(reputation or accreditation).11 In person, authentication begins with visual 
and auditory cues: a human being walks into a physical place with a certain 
gait, wearing distinctive clothing, speaking a given language, and so forth. In 
some circumstances, this self-identification is sufficient; a bald man with a 
gray beard is unlikely to be asked for government ID to verify age when buy-
ing alcohol. Sometimes one’s identity must be further established by reference 
to accreditation by third parties. In the modern world, the party that performs 
the verification of one’s identity (say a department of motor vehicles) is often 
split from the party relying on that identification (say a liquor store). The veri-
fication process is accomplished by providing some kind of credential, which 
the relying party views and determines whether to trust. The storage and use 
11   Dick Hardt, OSCON 2005 Keynote – Identity 2.0, August 1, 2005, http://www.identity20.
com/media/OSCON2005/ (“Identity is what I say about me, and what others say about 
me.”).
1c h a p t e r  o n e   State of Play: Digital Identity Interoperability 6
of that credential is controlled by the individual, the one in possession of her 
driver’s license. In most cases the liquor store does not retain any information 
about the individual – they simply check the credential and move on.
Digital ID is a necessary foundation of many forms of online exchange. On-
line, when users want to engage in an exchange that requires knowing with 
whom they are dealing, the cues that individuals rely on in the real world 
are not present. The most common method of accrediting identity online is 
to use financial institutions, which must have in-person relationships with 
their clients, as intermediaries, but this only allows validation of a narrow set 
of personal data, such as credit card numbers and perhaps billing addresses.   
The exchange of payment information is only a limited example of what we 
refer to as Digital ID.  According to the Identity Gang, a collaborative group 
of thinkers loosely joined online, Digital ID is defined as “A digital repre-
sentation of a set of claims made by one party about itself or another digital 
subject.”12 As Digital ID consists only of a set of claims about an identity, it is 
simply a bundle of data, less tied to the individual than a personal identity. In 
this case study, we focus on Digital ID applications between different entities 
over the Internet; because of the broad, global scope of our inquiry, we wish 
to point out that we are not primarily addressing identity provisioning within 
an enterprise when we refer to Digital ID.
A Digital ID system can serve any of several functions: authentication, veri-
fication, uniqueness, linkage, and reputation. Identification in general is the 
process of evaluating – based on the data provided – who a given person is, 
while “authentication implies that a decision is made based on the actual cor-
roboration of information, implying a larger degree of dependability.”13 Au-
thentication is the verification of the data – or credentials – provided during a 
user’s attempt to gain authorization to do something online. Authorization is 
granted, in a system of this sort, only after successful authentication. Linkage 
and reputation are both functions of Digital ID that describe connections – 
between people, and in what light they view each other. 
12   Identity Gang, Definitions, http://www.identitygang.org/moin.cgi/Identipedia (last visited 
30 October 2007).
13   A Roadmap for a Pan-European eIDM Framework by 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/informa-
tion_society/activities/egovernment_research/doc/eidm_roadmap_paper.pdf (last visited 
30 October 2007).c a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 7
It is important to note that in this case we are focusing on the part of identity 
that consists of facts about a person; we are not discussing an individual’s 
personality-inspired identity – measured by likes and dislikes, friends, and 
beliefs--but rather the bundle of data that uniquely distinguishes the indi-
vidual from all others. The credentials we concern ourselves with here include 
government-issued ID numbers, credit card information, address, birth date, 
credit history, etc. This part of one’s identity is much more about the various 
“puzzle pieces” that make you you and not someone else, as opposed to the 
more qualitative elements that comprise one’s persona online, increasingly 
expressed through channels such as MySpace, blogs, and personal Web sites. 
Gathering Digital ID information is a challenge. A Web site can gather cer-
tain information about a user – such as IP address and client software – pas-
sively, but must ask or require the user to actively share any more personally 
identifying information. The site, ordinarily governed by a private party other 
than the individual, controls the information – how it is stored and how it 
is used. While a site’s owners request information and it is often in the user’s 
best interest to be truthful and in the site owner’s interest to be prudent with 
the user’s data, obtaining and maintaining that information is not a simple 
task. The mere display of a “registration page” – on which a site asks the user 
for the information the site deems necessary and relevant to a transaction – is 
sufficient to cause many users to click away. Most users are tired of filling in 
forms.14 If they do register, band-aid techniques are required in order to verify 
that the people creating the profiles are real. For example, the user account 
creation process on many Web sites includes a process by which the user 
enters an email address, the site sends an email to that address with a link or 
verification code, and the user must click the link or enter the code before her 
account is activated. This provides some degree of assurance that the user is 
indeed a live being and not a spambot, and is often sufficient authentication 
for the site. However, if the site needs to know that the person using it now is 
the same person who used it yesterday, more ad-hoc authentication is needed. 
This usually comes in the form of a username and password specific to that 
site, so, say, a message board will know that it is the same live being com-
menting yesterday and today, and conversations can be tracked, reputations 
established, and trust networks built.
14   Paul Madsen, The Liberty Alliance, April 1, 2003, http://webservices.xml.com/pub/a/
ws/2003/04/01/liberty.html.c h a p t e r  o n e   State of Play: Digital Identity Interoperability 8
When users have many profiles, usernames and passwords become cumber-
some. The average technology worker spends 14 minutes each day simply log-
ging into and out of the many systems she uses.15 The problem with the cur-
rent state of network identity is that the burden of maintaining these islands 
of identity falls to the individual, who is ill equipped to do so efficiently. It is 
the individual who is responsible for remembering the multiple user name/
password pairs for each of these user profiles, and it is the individual who must 
manage the information that each Web site maintains in order to ensure that 
it is both up to date and appropriate. To address the task of remembering all 
their user names and passwords, users will typically either try to use the same 
combination (which isn’t always possible) or record these values elsewhere. 
Either case results in a reduction in the level of security that the user names 
and passwords were designed to provide. In addition, the ad-hoc nature of 
creating separate identifying profiles at every Web site makes it difficult for 
businesses to share information that would be useful for the consumer to have 
them know. For example, it would be convenient for a travel booking site to 
know that a user prefers to rent cars from a specific rental company, and to 
know with what companies the user has rewards cards, without the user hav-
ing to fill them in if she finds a cheaper rate from a new service.  Some Web 
sites are able to collect this sort of information, but only after the user trusts 
them with her login information for other sites that have it stored.
Digital identity solutions have been under consideration – and in develop-
ment – for many years. Smart cards were an early source of authentication, 
valued for their strength over the username/password mechanism. Smart cards 
are a type of hardware token,16 equipped with a computer chip that contains 
vital information about the cardholder. The card, about the size of a credit 
card, works when it is read by a card reader, whose software communicates 
with the chip and carries out certain commands or operations. Most smart 
cards understand commands written according to ISO 7816 specifications.17 
15    Interview with Brian Arbogast, June 4, 2007. 
16   Hardware tokens are physical objects that, usually in conjunction with a password or 
other security measure, serve to authenticate the holder and allow access to a secure 
system. We recognize that numerous types of hardware tokens are in use, but only treat 
smart cards here to simplify the discussion. Many of the same issues apply to other 
hardware tokens as well.
17   Wikipedia, Smart card, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_card (last visited 30 October 
2007).c a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 9
Not all smart cards are interoperable, though, and their design has a range 
of drawbacks and limitations.18 Two U.S. government agencies, the General 
Services Administration (GSA) and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) have only recently begun thinking about a standardized 
interface that would allow all types of smart cards (and there are at least 100 
varieties) to communicate with each other.19 
Digital  certificates,  another  security  mechanism  for  digital  identification, 
have been in use for decades in one form or another.20 Digital certificates 
are attachments to email or other communications intended to ensure that 
the sender is indeed the person he or she claims to be, and that the intended 
recipient of the message is indeed the one reading it. Digital certificates are 
issued by a Certificate Authority (CA), a third-party organization that both 
parties trust. The CA also generates digital signatures and public-private key 
pairs. Using a private key obtained from the CA, a recipient can decrypt a 
message, decode and verify the digital certificate, and know that the message 
is authentic. Similarly, if the recipient wants to send an encrypted message 
back to the sender, she can do so by encrypting it with the sender’s public key. 
Through pre-existing relationships with trusted organizations such as finan-
cial institutions, the CA is able to guarantee the identity of individuals au-
thenticating themselves with CA-issued digital certificates.21 Individuals can 
also create their own digital certificates, but without external accreditation, 
such “self-signed” certificates carry less weight.
Human, technological and market failings are present in the dynamics of each 
18   Radio-frequency identification (RFID) smart cards have become popular recently for sys-
tems such as public transportation and tracking goods through a supply chain, and have 
recently been incorporated into newly issued passports in many Western countries. See, 
e.g., Anne Broache, RFID passports arrive for Americans, August 14, 2006, http://www.
news.com/RFID-passports-arrive-for-Americans/2100-1028_3-6105534.html. However, 
many experts cite privacy concerns about the ability to more closely link people to their 
movements and activities, which have been aggravated by use of RFID chips in pass-
ports.
19   National Institute of Standards and Technology, SmartCard FAQ, available at http://web.
archive.org/web/20070711101540/http://smartcard.nist.gov/faq.html.
20   See, e.g., Verisign: A History, http://www.verisign.com/static/036566.pdf (last visited 30 
October 2007).
21   Webopedia, Certification authority, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/C/certification_
authority.html (last visited 30 October 2007).c h a p t e r  o n e   State of Play: Digital Identity Interoperability 10
of these systems, especially when applied to tasks outside the four corners 
of their original purpose. Remembering one’s username and password be-
comes increasingly difficult the more profiles one creates online. Smart cards 
are more secure, but they have to be carried around, and they are not fully 
interoperable worldwide. Furthermore, while they are physical objects, they 
contain software that is not unbreakable.  Digital certificates are little under-
stood by the greater community, and with some overhead to obtain, they are 
not widely utilized by typical Internet users. Biometric ID22 raises substantial 
privacy concerns and (for better or worse) is not transferable. These meth-
ods of authentication are termed by security researchers “shibboleths,” which 
come in three types: something you know (a password), something you have 
(a smart card or digital certificate), and something you are (a fingerprint or 
other biometric ID). More secure systems make use of more than one of 
these, but even then they are not foolproof, as the three types of shibboleths 
have also been facetiously described as “something you forget, something you 
lose, and something you cease to be.”23
Definition:	Digital	ID	Interoperability 1.1.1 
Interoperability of Digital ID systems is an important issue in the ongoing 
discussion about how best to achieve strong and flexible authentication while 
successfully addressing privacy and security concerns. It is important to de-
velop a clear definition of Digital ID interoperability, but no canonical defini-
tion has emerged. Such a definition must be broad enough to include the full 
range of possible identity solutions and their approaches to interoperability, 
from technical to procedural, whether implemented by private-sector coop-
eration or government action. In addition, as in our assessment of a DRM 
interoperability definition, it must not presume a preference for or against 
interoperability, and it must be flexible enough to include a range of levels 
of interoperability. Given the broad range of possible Digital ID systems and 
approaches to interoperability, this definition must be fairly broad. 
For purposes of this work, we loosely conceive of Digital ID interoperabil-
22   Biometric ID involves identifying a user by certain characteristics of her physiology or 
behavior, including iris or retinal scan, facial recognition, or voice identification. Each of 
these is increasingly used in the private sector, while fingerprints and DNA have well-
known applications in identifying people in the law enforcement context.
23   Wikipedia, Shibboleth (computer security), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Shibboleth_%28computer_security%29 (as of 3 October 2007, 08:23 GMT).c a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 11
ity as a constantly shifting interconnection among ID users, ID providers, 
and ID consumers that permits the transmission of Digital ID information 
between them via a secure, privacy-protected channel. It is also informative 
to think about interoperability from the perspective of perhaps overbroad 
stakeholder groups, including:
Individuals (also referred to as users or subjects) – who want to be able  •	
to share aspects of their identity efficiently and securely regardless of the 
service or platform, with at least some level of ID portability; 
Relying parties (usually providers of services individuals want to use) –  •	
who want easy and secure access to accurate, timely, and relevant infor-
mation about individuals from any source to maximize the value of their 
trust relationships and better serve their users, while limiting their own 
exposure to risks of a data breach;
ID providers – who want effective and sustainable means to provide  •	
Digital ID services to any user and any relying party; and
Society as a whole – which wants to balance convenient and secure au- •	
thentication and accreditation with other social needs such as privacy.
Definition:	Digital	ID	Innovation 1.1.2 
Innovation in Digital ID likewise requires definition. For the purposes of this 
case, we define innovation as the process of developing and introducing new 
elements into products and services, noting that this occurs both within the 
digital identity “layer” and atop it. In a closed, proprietary sense, innovation 
can manifest as product updates and feature releases. In a more open sense, 
it can also include new developments by outsiders, including users, third 
party programmers, and even competitors of the original producer or service 
provider. Innovation can occur within the Digital ID space, in technology 
and in business models. As Digital ID has the potential to be an enabling 
technology, there is also the possibility of innovation happening on ‘layers’ 
above this space – in Web services, at the content layer, and in areas not yet 
conceived.24
24   Jonathan Zittrain discusses the potential that a platform technology has to enable in-
novation at higher levels in Th e  Fu T u r e  o F  T h e  In T e r n e T  – a n d  ho w  T o ST o p  IT (Yale University 
Press, forthcoming 2008). Eric von Hippel, among others, has also written about the c h a p t e r  o n e   State of Play: Digital Identity Interoperability 12
In contrast to the findings in our DRM case, we see there is a greater level of 
interoperability in Digital ID, and that there is a more widely shared sense 
that higher levels of interoperability might provide a viable solution to the 
identity challenge. For example, in May of 2005, Kim Cameron of Micro-
soft released “The Laws of Identity,” a set of principles that developers of 
Digital ID solutions should take into account. The “Laws” were written as 
the result of a collaborative effort from individuals across industries and in 
academia, and have largely been adopted as strong guiding principles for a 
Digital ID infrastructure. While the developers of the Laws did not oppose 
non-interoperable systems, they concluded that an interoperable overarching 
infrastructure would benefit the Internet ecosystem by enabling individuals 
to use a wide variety of types of identities with different relying parties as ap-
propriate to each transaction.
Models	of	Digital	ID	Systems 1.1.3 
Digital ID solutions have thus far taken a variety of approaches. The models 
differ based on conflicting views about who ought to hold identifying data 
and who ought to control it. The models outlined below -- user-centric, fed-
erated and centralized -- each start from different basic philosophies – that 
users should control data, that data should be more or less widely distributed 
and trusted, and that data should be consolidated in a single repository, re-
spectively. We recognize that these models are not rigidly defined and overlap 
in some areas. They may not exhaust the realm of possible approaches to the 
issue, but when taken together they cover the major efforts currently under 
development.
User-Centric	Models	 1.1.3.1 
A user-centric model driven by privacy concerns aims to leave control with 
the user as to when and how their data is given to others. In a user-centric 
model, the user must initiate or approve any transfer of personal informa-
tion before it takes place, either directly or through client or agent software 
with predefined rules for authorization. The degree to which a user is directly 
involved with each transaction varies; recurring e-commerce orders and au-
tomatic bill payments could be accomplished in a user-centric manner. The 
importance of users modifying or adding new features to existing products. See gener-
ally Eric von Hippel, de m o c r a T I z I n g  In n o v a T I o n  (MIT Press 2005), available at http://web.
mit.edu/evhippel/www/books/DI/DemocInn.pdf.c a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 13
defining characteristic of a user-centric model is that it is philosophically and 
practically based on relatively active user consent each time identifying in-
formation is released, as opposed to company-authored privacy policies and 
one-sided terms of service. Consequently, the user and not the ID provider 
retains ownership of her data in a very real and practical sense.
To illustrate one example of a user-centric model, the following steps describe 
the sequence that CardSpace (see part 1.2.3 below) uses. This system begins 
with the individual obtaining various ‹cards,› which contain identifying in-
formation. This could be from, say, the individual’s bank, verifying that they 
do indeed have money in the relevant account. The individual then virtually 
shows this card to a retailer, who learns 1) that the individual is indeed a 
breathing person with whom a bank has a relationship, and 2) that the person 
has money (and they may even learn how much). This differs from the current 
models of Digital ID because in a user-centric model, the retailer can get all 
the information it needs without asking for that which it does not require. 
Table 1. The Transfer of Information in a User-Centric Model25
Steps in [the following] sample sequence, defined by Microsoft Card-
Space and followed by compatible open-source projects such as Higgins 
and others, are as follows:
1. A certain user named Alberto uses the Firefox browser (or, rather, Fire-
fox with an extension26) to go to the Best Buy27 Web site. This site acts 
as the “Service Provider.” 
2. Best Buy’s web page contains special HTML tags that are recognized 
by the Firefox extension as indicating that it is possible to sign-in using an 
I-Card, and that the site requires a certain set of information, or “claims” 
(e.g., name, email address, minimum age, etc.). The Firefox extension 
reads Best Buy’s “policy” (i.e. what that Service Provider site requires in 
terms of claims and acceptable “token” types for secure packaging).
25   Mary Rundle and Paul Trevithick, Interoperability in the New Digital Identity Infrastruc-
ture, January 2007, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=962701. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 
2.5 License.
26   Some Identity Selectors require an extension to operate on some computer platforms 
and/or browsers.
27   Best Buy does not actually support CardSpace at the moment.c h a p t e r  o n e   State of Play: Digital Identity Interoperability 14
3. The Firefox extension conveys the site’s policy to Alberto’s Identity se-
lector and requests a token that conforms to this policy. Alberto’s Identity 
selector then begins the “authentication” user experience. If this is the first 
time that Alberto has visited the Best Buy site, a page is displayed showing 
information about that Service Provider, including the site’s level of security.  
Alberto next sees a dialog displaying his various I-Cards. Each I-Card 
represents a certain combination of data, or a claim. His collection of 
I-Cards might include, among others, one containing information from 
his driver’s license and car insurance policy, another with his health-club 
membership information, and yet another with payment information and 
a shipping address. Unless Alberto’s I-Cards were self-issued,28 they each 
have an associated Identity Provider (e.g., a bank, government agency, etc.) 
that Alberto has designated to fill in the actual data (the “data values”).  
Alberto’s  Identity  selector  searches  his  collection  of  I-Cards  to 
find  those  whose  claims  would  match  what  is  required  by  Best 
Buy.  It  then  grays  out  (disables)  the  I-Cards  that  do  not  have 
the  required  claims  and  displays  only  those  cards  that  fit  the  bill.   
Alberto selects the I-Card he wishes to use and clicks on it. He can also 
choose to push a button to preview the data elements associated with a 
card, and thereby review his name, age, current bank balance, etc. before 
releasing this information to a Service Provider like Best Buy. 
4. When Alberto picks an I-Card and clicks on it, his Identity selector 
sends a request over the Internet to the I-Card’s associated Identity Pro-
vider (in this case, the Bank of Canada), requesting it to provide the data 
values which Alberto has entrusted to it (e.g., “Albert” for first name, 
“over 18” for age, etc.). 
5. The Bank of Canada as Identity Provider gathers the relevant data 
elements and wraps them in a cryptographically signed security token, 
which it then sends to Alberto’s Identity selector.
6. Alberto’s Identity selector sends the requested token to the Firefox 
extension. 
28   Most cards will be issued and signed by a third-party Identity Provider on the Internet, 
but the user can also make claims about himself. Such self-issued cards are less likely 
to be accepted by secure Web sites seeking third-party accreditation, however.c a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 15
7. The Firefox extension sends the token to Best Buy. Finally, Best Buy 
unwraps the token and takes out the information that is needed for the 
transaction.
 
In many ways, this model mirrors the process that occurs in real space when 
an individual makes a traditional purchase at a store. The selection of the 
I-Card occurs just as people select a passport when traveling versus a library 
card when checking out a book.  The issuing authority and the information 
contained match the needs of the transaction.
In its ideal form, a digital user-centric model would function better than real-
life authentication in several ways. In our liquor store example from above, 
the individual shows a driver’s license in order to verify that she is of legal age 
to buy alcohol. However, the driver’s license contains all kinds of sensitive 
information the clerk does not need – name, address, height, unique iden-
tifying number, etc. In a more private environment, it should be possible to 
verify only the information required – that the individual holding the card 
is of legal drinking age.29 For instance, in the case of Alberto, his card would 
only provide the necessary information, which includes his shipping address, 
minimal payment details and perhaps a way to contact him, in case his order 
is delayed.
A user-centric model must have at least a base amount of interoperability in 
order for an individual to use their digital ID for multiple services. The data 
format (such as XML, SAML, or OpenID protocols) and the authentication 
systems at the endpoints would, at the very least, have to support the prof-
fered credentials. A greater level of interoperability would entail developing a 
consistent interface, such that the experience is seamless between sites. One 
could imagine a system whereby similarly situated retailers would request 
similar information in an identical way from their customers. In between 
common understanding of authentication credentials and completely iden-
tical ID systems, there are many ways user-centric Digital ID systems can 
interoperate with one another.
Interoperability between user-centric and non user-centric systems is also 
29   Perhaps we tolerate the excess information the clerk could obtain during the transaction 
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possible. For instance, an individual could have a credential allowing her to 
log into the site of her bank, which could then retrieve her account informa-
tion from federated stockbrokers and banks, her employer, and tax authorities 
to present a complete financial picture without further user interaction. This 
would be possible even if her bank had a user-centric ID model but the tax 
authorities did not. 
This model provides some additional benefits for the user. Though data can 
still be stored with a relying party once the data is given in a transaction, the 
user-centric model allows the individual to give minimal information. Thus, 
the relying party has much less to give away or lose (as in the case of a breach). 
The relying party can also benefit from such a model, as users are more likely 
to give better, more honest or more updated information when they are not 
being asked to for too much information, too often. Furthermore, the infor-
mation provided by the user can be easily checked with the Identity Provider, 
causing greater accuracy and less potential for fraud.
A major drawback of the user-centric model is its complexity. There are sig-
nificant technical challenges of creating a system that sufficiently satisfies all 
parties, such that they actually use it. With this come social challenges in 
educating business owners and users. Most web businesses are accustomed 
to asking users to provide identifying information – often more than strictly 
necessary – and users are used to providing it, and setting up a username and 
password for each site. This situation is familiar, if cumbersome. No under-
standing of technology or relationships involving third parties is necessary. In 
contrast, a user-centric Digital ID model requires both user and relying party 
to develop relationships with one or more trusted Identity Providers and pos-
sibly install and learn new software. Less tech-savvy individuals and relying 
parties may initially feel that the status quo is “good enough.” This attitude 
could be a barrier to widespread adoption. Furthermore, because businesses 
that currently collect identifying data frequently profit by using it for mar-
keting and/or selling it to direct marketers, they may be reluctant to give up 
control over their customers’ data.
Federated	Models	 1.1.3.2 
The federated model features network identity and user information stored 
across and recognized at various locations on the Internet. While the storage 
locations are linked such that information can be easily shared, there is no 
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centric if it allows the user to maintain control over which sites obtain her 
information and how much. The main characteristic of a federated model is a 
group of sites or systems, such as the UK Federation educational consortium,30 
that each trust the information about users provided by one another.
Once an “identifier” is agreed upon for a specific user, and that user has been 
authenticated by a federation member that she trusts, she will be able to navi-
gate to any of the member service providers and be granted appropriate per-
missions based on her unique identifier that is shared among the multiple ser-
vice providers. The process of establishing a shared identifier for a single user 
is often referred to as “federating” that user. The Liberty Alliance, described 
later, fosters federated digital identity models by providing protocols, and a 
way to test their interoperability.
Another example of a federated model is Shibboleth,31 an open source proj-
ect sponsored by Internet2 that allows a relying party to determine relatively 
seamlessly whether a user from another trusted system has the correct attri-
butes or permissions to access a given resource. To illustrate how a federated 
system works, below is a slightly simplified description of how an individual 
would use a Shibboleth-based system. The particulars of other federated sys-
tems vary somewhat, but the principles will be similar.
Table 2. The Transfer of Information in a Federated Model
1. Betty, a researcher at Harvard University, needs to use an electronic 
database that she has learned is available to researchers at Oxford Uni-
versity. Betty has never been to Oxford and does not have a login ID at 
Oxford, but Harvard and Oxford are both part of a trusted Shibboleth 
federation.32 She opens a web browser and pulls up the Oxford library 
web page, then clicks the link to the resource she needs, which is re-
stricted to authorized users only.
30   UK Federation, http://www.ukfederation.org.uk/ (last visited 10 October 2007). See also 
Joint Information Systems Committee, JISC introduction to federated access manage-
ment animation, http://www.jisc.ac.uk/whatwedo/themes/access_management/federati-
on/animation (last visited 10 October 2007).
31   Shibboleth, http://shibboleth.internet2.edu/ (last visited 10 October 2007).
32   Note that these two universities do not currently have such a relationship, but could 
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2. Betty’s browser is directed to a Where Are You From (WAYF) server, 
which attempts to ascertain her home site or Identity Provider. Betty 
might have to choose Harvard from a list of institutions including Ox-
ford and other members of the UK Federation, or the WAYF server 
might be able to determine her home site automatically through software 
on Betty’s computer or simply from the fact that her IP address is on the 
Harvard network.
3. The WAYF server, having learned that Harvard is Betty’s home site, di-
rects Betty’s browser to a Harvard login page. This login might be imple-
mented using the open-source Central Authentication Service33 or any 
other system of authentication that can interface with Shibboleth. Betty, 
recognizing the familiar Harvard page, types in her Harvard user ID and 
password.
4. Harvard’s server, after verifying Betty’s user ID and password, sends 
Betty to Oxford’s library server with an ID number (say ABC123) and a 
set of attributes (Harvard authorized user, staff, researcher, etc.). The ID 
number is specific to this transaction, and Harvard’s server will verify it if 
Oxford’s server requests it, but at no point does Oxford’s server learn that 
it is Betty, specifically, who is requesting access to the database.
5. Oxford’s server checks the list of attributes against the categories of us-
ers authorized to access the database. Although Oxford’s server does not 
know the identity of user ABC123, it knows that she is a researcher and 
that researchers are allowed to access the database. Therefore, Oxford’s 
server approves Betty and directs her browser to the database search 
page.
 
The level of interoperability within a federation is often fairly high, as they 
work best with seamless data transfer. The level of difficulty of a relying party 
joining a federation is more variable – for many, making it easy to have a large 
number of members is to their advantage. However, complex technical speci-
fications or concerns about competitive advantage or security may preclude 
a federation – depending upon its rules and the technology choices made 
by its designers – from being open to new members.  Furthermore, having 
33   Central Authentication Service, http://www.ja-sig.org/products/cas/ (last visited 10 Octo-
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many different types of institutions as part of the federation each with its own 
categories or policies regarding its own users may make it difficult for admin-
istrators to properly determine what categories of users should have access to 
each resource.  Thus, scalability is a potential problem unless the federation is 
relatively homogeneous (as with British schools in the UK Federation).
Cooperation between federations is beginning to occur as federations identify 
partners beyond their initial offerings. In these cases, the offerings to the end 
user can improve substantially, but if the technology and rules the federa-
tions use are different, it can be difficult to implement these cross-federation 
initiatives. A base level of interoperability is needed in order to broaden the 
availability of the services provided by the federations.
However, some observers have expressed skepticism as to what extent and 
under what circumstances federations driven by for-profit corporations will 
benefit consumers. Just as companies that currently hold customer data often 
use it to profit directly (by selling it) or indirectly (by facilitating marketing 
and promotions), for-profit companies may seek to profit from federation, 
selling access to user databases to other online merchants. A wide variety of 
federated systems are possible, so the consequences for both corporations and 
consumers of federation in general are uncertain.
Centrally-Controlled	Models	 1.1.3.3 
A centrally controlled model consists of one or more isolated repositories to 
which users give identity and user information. It can be one single (perhaps 
ubiquitous) source, or the ad-hoc repositories set up by most e-commerce 
sites in use today and other sites requiring registration. This centrally-con-
trolled model is the dominant ID model in practice on the Internet today, yet 
it has few defenders as a system other than those who currently profit from it, 
as discussed above, through direct marketing and other related practices. 
In a system with many ad-hoc repositories, when the user fills in a web form, 
the site owner takes that information and places it in a database. Sometimes 
the user has control over what data is kept in the repository, to whom it is 
released, and how long it is stored; more often, the site simply lists a privacy 
policy, outlining the ways in which they will use the data provided. For com-
pleteness, we will outline the undoubtedly familiar experience that our user 
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Table 3. The Transfer of Information in a Centralized Model
Assume that Alberto, the user from Table 1, wishes to make a purchase 
from Best Buy but does not have CardSpace or another user-centric Dig-
ital ID program on his computer.
1. Alberto goes to Best Buy’s Web site, chooses a product, and clicks the 
checkout button.
2. If Alberto has not bought from Best Buy before, he will be asked to 
register. He must type in his name, billing and shipping addresses, credit 
card information and security codes, and provide a username and pass-
word so he will not have to type all of this information in the next time 
he wants to buy from Best Buy.
3. After performing some verification of the credit card data provided, 
Best Buy processes the order and stores Alberto’s information. Best Buy 
can make any use of this data permitted by its privacy policy,34 and the 
next time he goes to Best Buy’s Web site, Alberto can (if he remembers 
the username and password he provided) use some of the stored informa-
tion, but will probably have to input the credit card information again 
to make fraud less likely.
 
A centralized model could also encompass a single source to which a user pro-
vides information, to which sites could send requests for specific identity data. 
This type of centralized control simplifies matters, but users are wary of entrust-
ing all their data to a single source, especially one that is also holding everyone 
else’s data. The single repository is also a single point of failure; if there is any 
damage to that repository, users may no longer be able to access their identity 
credentials, and if the database is breached, the hacker could get access to ev-
eryone’s information. Providing a lot of data to Google Accounts (see Section 
1.2.4 below), for instance, entails considerable trust in Google’s security and re-
liability. Nonetheless, Google Accounts is somewhat user-centric in that users’ 
information is only transferred after they specifically choose to log into a site.
34   Best Buy’s current privacy policy allows it to use users’ personal information for adver-
tising and marketing purposes, as well as sharing it with Best Buy “entities or subsidiar-
ies,” unless the user opts out. See Best Buy, Privacy Policy, http://www.bestbuy.com/ol-
spage.jsp?id=cat12101&type=page&contentId=1043363533588 (last visited 10 October 
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The tendency of centralized control is to create information ‘silos’, in which 
data is stored in such a way that it is not sharable with others. If the informa-
tion is simply walled off from those who would misuse it, this is a benefit. At 
the same time, information silos can limit the ability of a user to transact with 
whomever she chooses easily. 
Interoperability among silos can occur, but integrating siloed data to create 
new services or facilitate existing ones is costly, cumbersome, and raises serious 
privacy and security concerns. This is so because, while federations are orga-
nized to interoperate securely, centralized repositories are usually implement-
ed with security controls intentionally designed or incidentally constructed to 
create lock-in and make interoperability difficult.  Service providers such as 
Facebook and LinkedIn have provided some degrees of interoperability with 
other data holders by making it possible for their members to enter log-in 
information for their email accounts and search their email address book for 
contacts with whom they are not yet connected on the service. To be sure, 
these efforts have the added benefit to the service provider of making it easier 
for users to help them grow the network, or to grow the number of connec-
tions within the existing network. (Not incidentally, this method of interop-
erability does not require the other data providers’ consent, which otherwise 
would have to be negotiated and paid for.) Similarly, financial services like 
Quicken and Yodlee allow a user to input all the various passwords and other 
security information for their banks’ Web sites and then view a consolidated 
financial picture in one place. However, these ad-hoc methods of linking cen-
tralized data repositories have obvious privacy and security drawbacks. But 
for whatever internal security procedures are in place at these companies and 
despite what the terms of service may say, rogue employees at Facebook or 
LinkedIn could peruse the e-mail of users who avail themselves of the integra-
tion service, and Yodlee and Quicken could pry into their customers’ financial 
affairs or even steal their money with remarkable ease. Taking part in these 
programs necessitates an enormous amount of trust that, in view of high-
profile data leaks in every sector of the economy, may not always be justified. 
Even if Yodlee and Quicken are completely trustworthy, the hacker who finds 
a way to break into their systems or the thief who makes off with their backup 
tapes will not be. And it goes almost without saying that, once a centralized 
ID provider has a consumer’s data, it may make uses of it that the consumer 
might not have authorized if asked specifically, but are permitted by the ID 
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In the case of government organizations, which often use a centrally-con-
trolled model to hold identity information, efforts towards interoperability 
are underway. In the European Union, directives that aim to enable infor-
mation to cross borders, such that a citizen of one EU state might have 
greater capabilities to do things such as access her bank, obtain a mortgage, 
or claim unemployment benefits while traveling in another EU state, have 
been adopted.35
In the United States, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12, 
released in August 2004, mandates interoperability between databases of dif-
ferent government organizations in an effort to increase knowledge sharing 
and national security.36 As the United States government is both a producer 
and a consumer of information, it has a vested interest in making identity 
information at least internally accessible. Interoperability could have the posi-
tive effect of enabling greater ease of services – or could engender privacy 
concerns that are aggravated by information sharing. 
experiences with digital Id Interoperability to  1.2 
date 
Interoperability is possible between sites and between ID systems. In the past, 
the fact that computing did not begin with communication between ma-
chines was a major hurdle to interoperability in this context. When Unix 
was written in the late 1960s, each model of computer required specialized 
translators to share data with other models.37 Today, standardized tools and 
methods enable the formation of large networks comprised of thousands of 
different brands and models of computers with relative ease. Standards orga-
nizations such as IEEE and OASIS keep track of various protocols, and by 
making standards known and available, they enable interoperability between 
new and old products.  
35   A Roadmap for a pan-European eIDM Framework by 2010, http://europa.eu.int/informa-
tion_society/activities/egovernment_research/doc/eidm_roadmap_paper.pdf (last visited 
30 October 2007).
36   Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, August 27, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-8.html.
37   David Upton, Bradley Staats, and Trent Staats, In F o r m a T I o n  Te c h n o l o g y  Tu T o r I a l  (Harvard 
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Most attempts to solve the problems associated with Digital ID involve cre-
ating some kind of system that would serve as a layer of communication 
between service providers. The processes to create such a layer involve either 
some kind of standards process – open or proprietary - or the de facto (emer-
gent) adoption of common technologies. The following approaches towards 
an emerging Digital ID infrastructure consist of methods that illustrate the 
variety of ways in which stakeholders view the problem and its possible solu-
tions. We do not attempt here to exhaustively survey the many initiatives cur-
rently underway, but only to analyze a few projects that collectively represent 
the various trends at work in the market.
If identity is to be embedded in the Internet, identity protocols must be in-
teroperable. Communications take place across well-accepted layers of the 
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (see Appendix). The addition of 
an identity infrastructure could sensibly establish another ‘layer’ in the OSI 
framework, enhancing interoperability across all users of identity on the In-
ternet. Even more modest, less interoperable efforts, though, still have much 
to offer in user privacy and convenience and in service integration.
Example	#1:	Liberty	Alliance	 1.2.1 
The Liberty Alliance was formed in 2001 by approximately 30 organizations 
to establish open standards, guidelines and best practices for federated iden-
tity management. It has 150 members today, including AOL, Fidelity, Sun 
Microsystems, Novell, Intel, Oracle and HP. The Liberty Alliance has devel-
oped protocols, some of which are now at OASIS, and helps developers to test 
their implementations of Liberty protocols against others, to ensure that they 
interoperate in the way that was intended. Thus, it ensures that consumers 
and users of Internet-based services and e-commerce applications that employ 
such implementations can authenticate and sign on to a network or domain 
once from any device, and then visit or take part in services from multiple 
Web sites. This federated approach does not require the user to reauthenticate 
and can support privacy controls established by the user. The main goal of 
Liberty is to increase the ability of parties to share in greater trust online, 
ideally with protocols built in a collaborative way that provide low barriers to 
entry for new parties.
Example	#2:	Higgins	 1.2.2 
The Higgins Trust Framework (formerly Eclipse Trust Framework) is an open c h a p t e r  o n e   State of Play: Digital Identity Interoperability 24
source software effort, begun by members of the SocialPhysics project.38 Hig-
gins is a software framework that relies on middleware service adapters that 
connect to external systems using that system’s native protocols or APIs. Hig-
gins’ goal is to give users more control of their online identity, profile and 
relationship information. Applications written with the Higgins API can inte-
grate the identity, profile, and relationship information across heterogeneous 
systems. The intention of Higgins is to become “glue,” simply connecting 
systems together and providing a platform on which to easily create new con-
nections. This goal caught our attention because it is very different from the 
approaches taken by other Digital ID systems, which were at least initially 
intended to compete with or replace one another, rather than bringing com-
peting systems together.
Within the Higgins framework, developers can exchange plug-ins and APIs 
for various preexisting identity systems as they become available. According 
to Higgins’ project goals, Higgins “introduces a new ‘context’ abstraction and 
allows developers to create adapters to legacy systems.” 39 In other words, in-
stead of introducing another new identity system, Higgins connects identities 
across system boundaries. Higgins also provides an end user with a Digital ID 
experience based on the “i-card” metaphor, through which it interoperates 
with a growing number of identity protocols such as Microsoft CardSpace, 
OpenID. Work, supported by Google, has begun on adding SAML 2.0 sup-
port as well.40
According to IBM, which has contributed code to the Higgins project:
[The Higgins framework] breaks up a person’s identity into pieces – or 
‘services’ – and lets computer users dictate who can access what parts 
of their identity information, within applicable privacy guidelines and 
laws. Organizations using ‘smart’ applications, built with Higgins open 
source tools, can share specific identity information, such as their te-
lephone number or buying preferences, according to rules set by the 
individual, or by an authorized third-party service provider acting on 
their behalf. Like Web services, companies will be able to build support 
38   By way of disclosure, the Berkman Center for Internet & Society has been closely in-
volved in the development of the SocialPhysics project, especially through the work of 
Fellow John Clippinger.
39   Higgins Trust Framework Project Goals, http://www.eclipse.org/higgins/goals.php, (last 
visited 30 October 2007).
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for Higgins into their applications, websites and services, and its open 
approach will support any technology platform and identity manage-
ment system.41 
IBM, Novell, Parity Communications, Oracle, Microsoft, the Liberty Alli-
ance and others have been very supportive of the Higgins effort. IBM and 
Novell have each allocated significant engineering resources to the project. 
However, it remains to see, when all is said and done, how many of the players 
will adhere to an open standard.42 
Example	#3:	CardSpace	 1.2.3 
Microsoft created CardSpace in an effort to implement its own system of 
user-controlled digital identity. This was not Microsoft’s first experience in 
the identity space. As an initiative, CardSpace stood out from Passport and 
Hailstorm, Microsoft’s two earlier attempts to create identity management 
systems. Passport and Hailstorm were closed, highly centralized systems, and 
many users did not feel comfortable providing a large corporation such as 
Microsoft with all of their personal details.43
CardSpace works in an identity infrastructure under tenets similar to those 
employed by Higgins; specifically, that identity works best (and safest) when 
it can be parsed into usable “chunks” and shared on an as-needed basis. Card-
Space works on a user-centric model as described above.  Thanks to support 
from Microsoft, CardSpace has been or will be made interoperable with the 
Higgins framework, Liberty Alliance protocols, and OpenID, among others.
CardSpace currently works with other Microsoft applications such as Win-
dows operating systems and Internet Explorer. Other implementations, such 
as the open-source Bandit project sponsored by Novell, also work with Card-
Space services. The protocols behind CardSpace are published and available 
royalty-free, with the hope that developers will use the protocols to extend its 
capabilities to other platforms and applications. If this happens, CardSpace 
could provide an interoperable Digital ID system.
41   IBM Corporation, Open Source Initiative to Give People More Control Over Their 
Personal Online Information, February 27, 2006, http://new.marketwire.com/2.0/rel.
jsp?id=682795&sourceType=1.
42   E-mail from John Henry Clippinger, May 29, 2007.
43   Dick Hardt, Why Passport did not become Ubiquitous, December 7, 2004, http://blame.
ca/dick/?p=35.c h a p t e r  o n e   State of Play: Digital Identity Interoperability 26
Example	#4:	Google	Accounts	Authentication	 1.2.4 
In July 2006, Google released its centralized account authentication service. 
Google provided code that helped developers creating web applications to 
utilize Google’s account access features in order to protect their web applica-
tions from un-authenticated users. In other words, access to a developer’s own 
web – or installed – application could be granted once the user supplied her 
Google username and password.44 When Google first released the API for 
these, it fell under much scrutiny. For example, Dick Hardt, founder of Sxip 
and a proponent of user-centric identity models, stated that Google Accounts 
Authentication (GAA) was moving identity management “two steps forward, 
one step back,” because of the centralization of users’ identities deeper into 
what Hardt called the “Google identity silo.”45 An alternative approach might 
be to allow a user to access a site or application built with the GAA API us-
ing a non-Google credential, although the consequences of doing so would 
be uncertain.
In this model, the developer can choose to specify whether authentication 
requires secure tokens or non-secure tokens. The use of secure tokens requires 
that the web application be registered with Google and file a certificate; if reg-
istered, the web application can secure all requests referencing an authentica-
tion token with a digital signature. This distinction between the use of secure 
versus non-secure tokens will certainly influence the type of web applications 
that utilize GAA API. For example, GAA may work well with a non-secure 
token if the user wants to log into a news site to read an article, but that 
same insecure login would appear unattractive to a user hoping to make a 
purchase online; exchange of monetary information clearly necessitates the 
highest levels of security. User education will be important to prevent phish-
ers and poorly configured Web sites from inappropriate use of the less secure 
GAA API.
When the web application needs to access the user’s Google service data,  •	
it directs the user to the Google Accounts URL.
44   Google Inc., Account Authentication, http://code.google.com/apis/accounts/Authentica-
tion.html (last visited 30 October 2007).
45   Dick Hardt, Google Account Authentication: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back, http://
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Google Accounts responds with an «Access Consent» page. This page  •	
prompts the user to log into their Google Account and grant/deny access 
to the service. 
The user logs into their Google account and decides whether to grant  •	
or deny access to the web application. If the user denies access, they are 
directed to a Google page rather than back to the web application.
If the user successfully logs in and grants access, Google Accounts redi- •	
rects the user back to the web application URL. The redirect contains an 
authentication token good for one use; it can be exchanged for a long-
lived token.
The web application contacts the Google service to confirm the authen- •	
tication token.
If the Google service recognizes the token, it will supply the requested  •	
data. 
The Authentication Proxy diagram shown below illustrates interactions be-
tween the three entities involved: web application, Google servers, and the 
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Google’s APIs make it easy for non-Google applications to consume Google 
services, but they are tied to the user’s Google credential. While increasing 
the value of that Google credential, this system also creates a bigger barrier to 
competing services and increases the users’ reliance on the Google credentials. 
As with CardSpace, the arrangement of open protocols could provide some 
degree of de-facto interoperability between different identity management 
solutions. However, given the core importance of trusted Google servers to 
the GAA framework, it is not clear what GAA would be without linkage to 
Google credentials.  Therefore, there is reason to question the long-term sus-
tainability of a Digital ID infrastructure based on GAA as it currently exists.
Example	#5:	Shibboleth 1.2.5 
As described above in Table 2, Shibboleth is an open-source, federated Di-
gital ID system designed initially to allow universities and other academic 
institutions to share resources. Although it was initially designed by Inter-
net2, others have contributed to it. In particular, Microsoft has sponsored 
work to integrate Shibboleth with CardSpace. Like Higgins, Shibboleth is 
agnostic about what technology is used by the servers at each endpoint, and 
it was designed in part to enable diverse existing login schemes to interope-
rate with one another. In that sense, its strength and its weakness is that it is 
an incomplete solution to interoperable Digital ID. On the one hand, each 
system connected to a Shibboleth federation can have a different system for 
users to authenticate, whether it be CardSpace, CAS, or something else, but 
on the other hand, each system must have another software solution on top 
of Shibboleth for it to be useful (otherwise users have no way to access Shib-
boleth). Some administrators might find it easier if they only have to install 
and administer a single authentication system.
Other	examples 1.2.6 
Open, industry and user-driven efforts towards interoperability and user-
control in digital identity have emerged in recent years. Additional examples 
include open source projects like OpenID and proprietary efforts like Micro-
soft Live ID. The goals differ from one to the next, but they each aim to pull 
standards efforts, technologies, and incentives together to create an emergent 
identity infrastructure that developers can build upon and companies and 
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These examples show the myriad ways in which efforts towards better Digital 
ID have so far manifested. Competition between companies has provided 
much of the motivation for these initiatives, as they either attempt to provide 
ID solutions or require good ID solutions for their value-added services. In 
the next section, we will discuss a range of incentives in more depth.
Forces at Play: some drivers and Inhibitors 1.3 
As with DRM, interoperable Digital ID is a complex system. The technology 
required to build, maintain, and secure the system gives rise to a constant 
cat-and-mouse game between developers and data holders on the one hand 
and those who seek to steal personal data on the other. In addition, a host 
of market forces provide incentives and disincentives for competition and 
cooperation. Societal opinions, especially surrounding privacy and surveil-
lance concerns, press companies and governments to consider legal regimes 
that protect individuals even as individuals currently sign away their privacy 
through user agreements and privacy policies on a regular basis.  Yet stronger 
government action could actually slow the process of developing Digital ID 
interoperability by freezing technological development or imposing signifi-
cant burdens on one or more stakeholders.  This section will attempt to lay 
out some of the drivers and inhibitors of interoperability in Digital ID.
Technology 1.3.1 
As shown by the processes outlined in the previous section, the technology 
underlying an ID infrastructure is complex, but there are numerous examples 
of at least some level of technical interoperability working. Consider, for ex-
ample, efforts to centralize government-issued identification. In the United 
States, technical interoperability was achieved with government employee 
identification,46 and in Portugal, a recent initiative centralized five different 
government ID cards into one system, making all the information accessible 
to the agencies that need it and to the citizens.47 However, also in the United 
States, there has been strenuous resistance to just the sort of single, national 
46   See, e.g., Daniel Pulliam, Federal employees begin receiving new ID cards, October 26, 
2007, http://www.govexec.com/story_page.cfm?articleid=35363.
47   See Andre Vasconcelos, The Portuguese Interoperability Framework applied to the 
Portuguese Citizen Card Project, presented at the OECD Workshop on Digital Identity 
Management (IDM), May 9, 2007, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/9/38573902.pdf.c h a p t e r  o n e   State of Play: Digital Identity Interoperability 30
ID that was achieved in Portugal.48
Many protocols for messaging and data exchange have developed through 
standards processes or subsequently been released openly. For example, Secu-
rity Assertion Markup Language 2.0 (SAML 2.0) was developed under OA-
SIS and ratified in 2005 as its standard, and includes input from the open 
source project Shibboleth and from the Liberty Alliance.49 Most of the under-
lying protocols used by CardSpace (WS-Trust, WS-MetadataExchange, etc.) 
have also been submitted to OASIS. Furthermore, in May 2007, Microsoft 
announced an extension to its Open Specification Promise to cover most of 
the protocols and specifications behind CardSpace 1.0.50 It thus committed 
to providing access to its CardSpace-related identity solutions and protocols 
on an open, royalty-free basis.
The Higgins project aims to create software to allow technical interoperability 
between diverse systems and bridging across multiple protocols. It has already 
achieved substantial interoperability among some of the major Digital ID sys-
tems, and continues to make progress on breaking down technical barriers.
The area of technical security requires mention, as the arms race between 
security developers and malicious hackers could present a barrier to the de-
velopment of a standard on which to base a highly interoperable Digital ID 
system. With identity fraud and other unsavory business models now provid-
ing financial incentives for thieves of identifying information, this issue is 
only growing. A lengthy standards process that attempts to build in security 
as part of its protocols could easily fall behind in the arms race before it is im-
plemented. It is heartening, however, that SSL and its successor TLS, which 
has developed through a public Request For Comments (RFC) process, are 
still sufficiently secure to enable widespread e-commerce despite many years 
of hackers undoubtedly trying to break them. Though creating such standard 
protocols is difficult, it can be achieved in this context, and once agreed upon, 
48   See Electronic Privacy Information Center, National ID and REAL ID Act, http://www.
epic.org/privacy/id_cards/ (last visited 10 October 2007).
49   Liberty Alliance, Liberty Tutorial, http://www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/
download/423/2832/file/tutorialv2.pdf (last visited 30 October 2007).
50   Microsoft Corporation, Microsoft Focuses on Interoperability for the Identity Metasys-
tem, May 23, 2007, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2007/may07/05-23-
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standards can be updated in an evolutionary fashion. We conclude that tech-
nology problems, while no doubt challenging, do not amount to a significant 
independent barrier to interoperability. 
Multiple	Market	Forces	Behind	Adoption 1.3.2 
The Digital ID infrastructure is a network effects business, meaning that wide-
spread uptake is required for the whole system to succeed – the more users 
participate, the greater the incentives to support them through a broad variety 
of market offerings. For businesses that provide ID solutions, the desire for 
interoperability with other systems may change depending on whether they 
believe they can create a sufficiently large network alone, versus depending 
on others to aggregate a large enough network to be useful to consumers. In 
the commercial Digital ID space, so far the market has rejected the idea of a 
single dominant player.51 Therefore it appears to be strongly in the ID busi-
ness’ interest to grow the market as a whole, rather than fighting for a large 
share of a small market. This may indicate that the ID business’ incentives 
are aligned with interoperability. However, those working in e-commerce, 
even within the same company as those creating Digital ID solutions, may 
have a different view.  Network effects could induce e-commerce professionals 
and other stakeholders to support an interoperable solution as well, but only 
once such a solution became a standard or gained significant user adoption. 
Service providers want to make it as easy as possible for customers to use their 
services, but will not make the potentially substantial investment in changing 
their authentication infrastructures to interoperate with Digital ID systems 
that only a handful of customers will use. An analogy can be made to web 
design – once Microsoft’s Internet Explorer (IE) web browser became domi-
nant, web designers only wrote web pages with IE in mind and tested them 
51   For example, Microsoft’s Passport was intended to be the full provider of identity man-
agement online, in part because users were wary of storing personal information in a 
central Microsoft database. ZDNet UK, Passport failure shows the folly of Microsoft’s 
ways, January 4, 2005, http://opinion.zdnet.co.uk/leader/0,1000002208,39183062,00.
htm. Around 2001, users started to bristle at the amount of information Microsoft ap-
peared to be collecting from them, as well as the emerging security threats introduced 
by the integration of Passport and the Windows operating system. Users were also 
worried about the lack of transparency. Dick Hardt, Why Passport did not become Ubiq-
uitous, December 7, 2004, http://blame.ca/dick/?p=35. Companies were not able to 
adopt the technology easily either – Microsoft’s licensing, at $10,000, was out of reach 
for many small businesses.  It is interesting, given this history, that Google Accounts and 
Microsoft Live ID each appear to be once again attempting a centralized Digital ID solu-
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to make sure they worked in IE. When Firefox (as well as Safari, Opera, and 
others) gained non-negligible market share, Web site owners had to go back 
and make their sites Firefox-friendly or risk losing customers who use Firefox 
primarily or exclusively. Until such a tipping point is reached, however, many 
service providers will resist interoperability.
Among businesses engaged in e-commerce in particular, incentives towards 
interoperability are weaker than among their ID business counterparts. This 
is especially true for companies engaged in the sale of products that can be 
termed e-commerce commodities – airline tickets, books, electronics, and 
the like. In this space, all that may be keeping a buyer going to one site 
over another may be the reality that the first site already has their log-in in-
formation, credit card numbers and preferences.52 Even though this lock-in 
may be fleeting, any part of the transaction process that can keep a customer 
creates incentives against interoperability. For businesses where information 
on previous transactions and habits can significantly enhance the customer 
experience, the ability to access an account’s history can establish more lasting 
lock-in.
In addition, for an e-commerce business, ID is only one factor of their busi-
ness model. Their greatest concern is that it work, preferably as unobtrusively 
as possible. Successful e-commerce merchants already have a customer base in 
their existing systems, and so have low incentives to change absent consumer 
demand. This explains in part why the process towards Digital ID interoper-
ability has seen fewer champions from the e-commerce space than from those 
interested in providing ID solutions. 
Market maturity also plays a strong role as a lever on interoperability of the 
Digital ID space. Interoperability may flounder if implemented too early in 
an emerging market, as the optimum technology and legal and social regimes 
are not yet obvious and stable. Any official initiative towards interoperability 
could be unsuccessful, as firms may innovate at a rate faster than the standards 
process.
There are some examples in which organizations seem to benefit from pro-
viding Digital ID interoperability. One area includes social networking sites, 
which have begun providing interoperability on an ad-hoc basis.  The ex-
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amples of Facebook, LinkedIn, Quicken, and Yodlee make it possible for the 
user to import information from another service.  However, this capability is 
rarely bi-directional, nor does it increase interoperability across the system in 
a widely meaningful way.
Some companies are based around the idea that strictly ‘transaction’ economic 
interests are too narrow. In the Web 2.0 era in which user communities, user 
experience and flexibility in the way individuals interact with the Internet are 
necessary, such companies are looking to extend their interactions with the 
user beyond the transaction. They are looking to compete on the layers su-
perimposed on top of the ID layer, rather than within the ID layer as we saw 
above. For these, incentives may be more closely aligned with interoperability 
of Digital ID because they are looking to compete at the next level – services 
– instead of at the identity layer.  While these enterprises may seek to retain 
customers by making interoperability with competing services difficult, they 
support Digital ID interoperability because a substantial user base is necessary 
to create the market for which they compete.
The	Role	of	Law 1.3.3 
The law might play a role in shaping or maintaining interoperability of Digi-
tal ID systems. While intellectual property protection (e.g. protection of pro-
tocols) and antitrust issues (e.g. standard-setting bodies, cartels, leveraging of 
market share) may play a role similar to that in the area of DRM (see DRM 
case study for further details), two issues seem of particular importance in the 
area of Digital ID systems.
First, if any interoperable Digital ID system is to emerge, all parties involved 
will benefit from understanding how liability will be allocated in the event of 
chargeback or fraud perpetrated through the system. In particular, what hap-
pens if a trusted member of a network is compromised? Because more and 
more transactions are occurring online, there are more criminal or fraudulent 
transactions online as well. In an interoperable Digital ID ecosystem it may 
be unclear which part of the system would assume liability for the credentials 
that are issued, and for the security of the transaction system. The structure of 
Liberty Alliance, for example, is based upon large companies forming “Circles 
of Trust,” which are tasked with part of the system or data, but so far there 
is no clearly delineated method for dividing responsibility. Whether there is 
need for ID-specific law to regulate liability or whether a careful design of 
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exposure53 is an open question. Therefore, legal uncertainty with regard to 
liability exposure in a multi-player Digital ID ecosystem may already have 
exerted and continue to exert a chilling effect on the establishment of Digital 
ID interoperability.
Second, legal diversity may act as an inhibiting force to interoperable ID 
systems, especially in the governmental context. As there are incentives to 
provide  interoperability  between  government  databases  –  e.g.,  the  ability 
to more effectively share information relevant to national security – several 
harmonization efforts have been executed. For example, when introducing a 
new “Buergerkarte” (identity card), the Austrian government worked closely 
with other European countries to integrate their respective ID capabilities.54 
However, subsidiarity concerns, pushing for smaller, simpler processes and 
organizations, as well as cultural differences between countries or regions55 
may work against a full harmonization of legal requirements.
From a user standpoint, an identity infrastructure can provide great conve-
nience and raise privacy concerns. As individuals move with greater frequency 
from place to place, disparate agencies can share information to enable ser-
vices to follow more seamlessly.56 However, if the government can find you 
to update your driver’s license, it can also find you to monitor your commu-
nications. Greater government capability in this regard creates at least some 
erosion of individual privacy. It is unclear, however, where government use of 
Digital ID is likely to fall on the spectrum from identifying citizens so they 
can vote online to an intrusive policeman tracking every online act.
53   See Manel Medina et al., Fidelity: Federated Identity Management Security based on 
Liberty Alliance on European ambit, http://www.celtic-fidelity.org/fidelity/Documenta-
tion.jsp?download=48 (last visited 30 October 2007): “All of them [i.e. circles of trust of 
the Liberty Alliance Project] should sign commercial, business and service agreements, 
through which they regulate their rights and duties to handle users attributes to provide 
tailored services to the users in the most transparent and user friendly way.”
54   See Austrian Citizen Card, http://www.buergerkarte.at/index_en.html (last visited 26 
October 2007).
55   Cf. Modinis-IDM, https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi 
(last visited 26 October 2007).
56   For example, in Massachusetts, the U.S. Postal Service will periodically share address 
change information with the Registry of Motor Vehicles, enabling them to send out ad-
dress change stickers for driver’s licenses. To be sure, this also enables enforcement of 
such things as resident parking.c a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 35
aSSeSSIng DIgITal ID  2
InTeroPerabIlITy
Potential	Benefits 2.1 
Interoperability of Digital ID would bring both benefits and drawbacks for 
consumers.  Many benefits and drawbacks will not become fully clear until 
the technology becomes more mature and innovative applications start to 
emerge, but some plausible predictions can be made.  Among the projected 
benefits of interoperability in this context are ease-of-use, privacy, anonymity 
and low price. An interoperable Digital ID system could also grow the Inter-
net economy as a whole by enabling new areas of Internet-based transactions. 
Most of these characteristics are made possible by interoperable single-sign-
on systems. Demand for low price is probably best satisfied by competition 
among ID providers, and interoperability allows them to move between com-
peting providers without prohibitive switching costs. 
Digital ID interoperability might help digital identification map more closely 
to the way identification happens in the real world, as identification in real 
life is approaching interoperability in many cases. Consider, for example, that 
passports are becoming more ubiquitous, and are accepted identification for 
many services – ranging from identity verification when boarding an airplane 
to verification of employment eligibility. If Digital ID were interoperable in 
a similar way, user confusion might be reduced.  Moreover, as mentioned 
above, an interoperable Digital ID system would enable the user to easily 
choose the relevant set of credentials or information to transmit – so a user 
could have a “passport” that could be used for many applications, but would 
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not actually have to convey all the information contained on her passport in 
order to check out a library book.
In addition, an emerging Digital ID infrastructure could include greater 
privacy control, reducing the social and financial risk that users incur when 
online. Overall, interoperable ID systems make it easier for users to engage 
in online transactions because they do not have to create new credentials for 
each site or each of several incompatible ID schemes. Interoperability gives 
users flexibility and choice by reducing the transactions costs associated with 
authentication and/or accreditation.
The potential growth of e-commerce with Digital ID interoperability is sig-
nificant, and the emergence of a layer of companies that provide Digital ID 
services is another potential area of market growth. The implementation of 
such a system would provide a platform for the development of value-added 
services on top of it.
With seamless authentication and payment could come a layer of Web servic-
es-enabled systems that require secure transfer of trusted information. Con-
sider a service in which a call from a GPS-enabled mobile phone to a taxi 
company could automatically provide location and payment information.57 
Anonymous  but  verifiable  authentication  could  also  transform  the  local, 
trust-based commerce models of Craigslist and classified ads more generally.
Interoperability of ID infrastructures is likely to increase innovation and com-
petition between online companies at the ID layer and at the layers above, as 
customers could easily switch without renewed identification. As competition 
then increases incentives to innovate in similar fields, we consider it to be a 
key potential benefit of Digital ID interoperability.
Potential drawbacks 2.2 
Drawbacks can be found both in the process towards interoperability in Digi-
tal ID and in the actual implementation of such a system. For one, though 
significant standard-setting processes have occurred, it remains to be seen 
how deeply committed the large players are to these standards.58 Since this is 
a market in which user uptake must be widespread, standard-setting efforts 
57   Interview with Eric Tiffany, June 13, 2007.
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that do not engender wide support could hold back the potential for market 
growth. Confusion over competing or incompletely compatible standards 
could also result in companies sitting on the fence, waiting for the space to 
settle out before acting.
Interoperability in Digital ID could also endanger businesses that depend 
on consumer lock-in for their customer base – which presents a drawback 
from the perspective of such businesses and their shareholders.59 However, 
given the low barriers to entry in terms of authentication (simply setting up a 
database of usernames and passwords), interoperability could also provide an 
opportunity for such companies to poach competitors’ customers.
Security presents an additional potential drawback, as the security of an ID 
system could be endangered by the mere fact of more parties having access 
to a certain ID, which increases the potential of misuse. Depending on the 
protocols and implementation, it might be more difficult for a breach or leak 
to be repaired once one occurs. Certainly, if any level of trust is involved, a 
breach can have more widespread consequences. A hacker able to successfully 
impersonate any trusted server would have carte blanche for identity theft or 
disrupting the entire trust network.
Though giving complete data to fewer parties enhances privacy, with interoper-
ability, a single party might end up in possession of much more information 
about a certain user than in case of non-interoperable identity-silos. Once a 
user authenticates to a site, it might be able to request a wide variety of other in-
formation from federated sites. This could also raise the potential for misuse. 
Finally, we can envision a scenario in which too much ease of use could prompt 
“identity” to be used for things where the consumer does not really want it, 
forcing authentication into places and activities where one could formerly be 
anonymous. Some of the most valuable applications of the Web are possible 
because the medium is anonymous, or at least relatively so. It would be a great 
loss if interoperable Digital ID became ubiquitous in ways that erode the po-
tential for anonymous (or at least quasi-anonymous) communication on the 
Web. In addition, the trend of more sophisticated phishing is worrisome in 
this regard, as consumers might transmit considerable information to spoofed 
Web sites by accident.
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Several approaches towards Digital ID interoperability are on the table. In 
general, Digital ID interoperability is in a later stage of development than 
DRM  interoperability  and  is  more  complex  than  interoperability  in  the 
mashups context. That said, full interoperability is a long way from being 
achieved in the Digital ID space. We will discuss several main approaches in 
the paragraphs below.
Interoperability in the Digital ID environment might be accomplished by a 
range of means, several of which are in progress. Non-regulatory, non-govern-
ment approaches include:
Ad-hoc or de-facto interoperability. As mentioned above, services such  •	
as Facebook, LinkedIn, Yodlee, and Quicken have provided ad-hoc and 
as-needed interoperability to users, in ways that increase the value of 
their services (if potentially opening themselves to greater liability for 
holding even more user data, unless they successfully disclaim it in their 
terms of service).
Open source, carrier-neutral projects. In recent months, Higgins has  •	
seen buy-in from most major players, and the mission of the project 
aligns with the goals of major stakeholders. This ‘glue’, if development 
and buy-in continue, could provide the type of generative interoperabil-
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ity that would allow a range of Digital ID solutions and business models 
at the ID layer, and could encourage innovation at upper layers.
Standardization and technical collaboration. As mentioned previously,  •	
technical interoperability is not sufficient for an interoperable Digital 
ID infrastructure, but it is a necessary condition.  Without technical 
collaboration, only the ad-hoc interoperability described above is likely 
to occur.  But if major stakeholders do not work together to integrate 
and market a system as interoperable, user adoption will continue to be 
limited.  Standards can lead to interoperability, but only if relevant par-
ties adopt and implement them.  In addition to the standards processes 
mentioned above, the ISO and W3C are forming working groups on 
privacy and ID systems, but so far no results are presented.60
Licensing and unilateral design. As seen by experiences with Passport and  •	
Hailstorm, a unilateral approach is a possible route to a kind of unanim-
ity of experience for users, but is highly unlikely to lead to interoperabil-
ity in such a complex environment.
Regulatory and government-initiated approaches are also being tested in some 
areas. As seen in previous sections, governments are working to make their 
own systems interoperable, and they are pressing others to be interoperable as 
well. They can encourage this in several ways:
Broad initiative. The EU’s Roadmap for a pan-European eIDM frame- •	
work by 201061 is one major example of governments encouraging in-
teroperability by sweeping plans across the board.
Subsidies. The PRIME Project (Privacy and Identity Management for  •	
Europe), which is funded by the European Union, is strongly focused 
on encouraging a user-centric experience.62 The GUIDE Project, in the 
eGovernment area, is also funded by the EU and conducts research and 
60   See Marit Hansen and Martin Meints, Digitale Identitäten – Überblick und aktuelle 
Trends, September 2006, http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/publications/2006/
DuD09_2006_543.pdf (in German only).
61   Available at http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/egovernment_research/
doc/eidm_roadmap_paper.pdf
62   See Marit Hansen and Henry Krasemann, eds, Privacy and Identity Management for Eu-
rope – PRIME White Paper, Jul. 18, 2005, https://www.prime-project.eu/prime_products/
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technological development that seeks to enable EU countries to provide 
eGovernment services seamlessly.63
Cooperation between governments.  While country-based solutions are  •	
useful for programs administered at the national level, the Internet en-
ables many projects that cross national boundaries.  Where governments 
cooperate in offline endeavors, it makes sense for them to connect in 
the Digital ID space as well.  As especially EU governments work to 
implement an ambitious plan for interoperability by 2010, they have 
encouraged focus on the issues associated with achieving this goal – they 
have encouraged dialogue between stakeholders, and provide a willing 
customer to ID solutions businesses.64
Mandating standards. As with the Homeland Security Presidential Direc- •	
tive mentioned previously, governments have also approached achieving 
technical interoperability by mandating standard data formats, which 
is important in data exchange between countries, or between agencies 
within a country.  However, such standardization could have serious con-
sequences in the event of a data breach like those we have seen in the 
commercial realm.
Public procurement. In Finland, for example, the tax board implement- •	
ed Liberty Alliance procedures to test the interoperability of several e-
governance solutions they were implementing.65 The result was a high 
degree of effectiveness in their implementation, which now allows for 
strong authentication and ease of a number of new services.66
Encouraging dialogue. Groups such as the Organisation for Economic  •	
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have encouraged Digital ID 
interoperability by fostering research on solutions and dialogue between 
stakeholders.
63   Creating a European Identity Management Architecture for eGovernment, http://istrg.
som.surrey.ac.uk/projects/guide/ (last visited 30 October 2007).
64   For one such example, see Modinis IDM, https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/modinis-
idm/twiki/bin/view.cgi/Main/WebHome (last visited 30 October 2007).
65   The Finnish National Board of Taxes Makes a Business Case for E-Authentication, http://
www.projectliberty.org/liberty/content/download/417/2814/file/Finland_casestudyFINAL.
pdf (last visited 30 October 2007).
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So far, we find no evidence that regulatory processes are currently under-
way to establish commercial Digital ID interoperability. There is no single 
dominant player in this environment, which has precluded most inquiries 
into competition or anti-trust issues, a typical entry point for government in-
volvement in commercial affairs. (In contrast, France’s DRM interoperability 
clause was inspired at least in part by Apple’s large market share, for which 
there is no analogue in the Digital ID story to date.) Furthermore, the lack of 
broad consumer demand had allowed the spotlight to remain on more visible 
issues like DRM and Internet neutrality.c a s e s t u d y   Digital Identity Interoperability and eInnovation 43
Summary
We conclude from this case study of Digital ID systems being built for the 
Internet that there is no single, clear path to the sort of interoperability that 
will lead to further innovation on the horizon. That is not to say that there 
is not interoperability between some leading systems; nor is it to say that 
interoperability would not be a good thing in terms of leading to innovation. 
The point is that there is no “silver bullet” approach to accomplishing ID 
interoperability in this context.
An interoperable Digital ID system for the Internet could lead to more secure, 
more private, and more efficient identity management. Significant market 
and legal forces combine to make implementation of any single, interoperable 
system a complex process; uptake is far from assured.
The multiple approaches to interoperability that are in progress in this field 
cover a broad range. On one end of the spectrum, informal groups of firms 
are collaborating through ad hoc networks; on another end of the spectrum, 
an interoperable approach to Digital ID might emerge from formal standards 
processes. Governments are playing a role at the margins of these develop-
ments, but industry is plainly leading the way. 
In order for major, market-clearing innovation in this field to occur, we an-
ticipate that these multiple industry efforts will consolidate into one or a few 
at most. Consumers, increasingly given a role through user-centric models, 
may have a larger-than-ordinary voice in the outcome. It is unlikely that gov-
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ernments will have a central role in this consolidation process, though they 
are likely to play a part in ensuring that data protection laws are upheld and 
that competition can ensue after interoperability is accomplished, if it comes 
to pass. 
Collaboration among industry leaders will be necessary in order to get the 
rest of the way towards an interoperable Digital ID system. Governments 
can help through soft regulatory approaches, such as bringing stakeholders 
together in dialogue and using their clout as major data holders and users. 
Interoperability and innovation in this environment will not come to pass 
through fiat of either major market players (as was attempted by Microsoft 
with Passport) or governments. This combination of industry efforts with a 
light-touch role for governments has the potential to lead to greater levels of 
interoperability in the Digital ID space. Once the technology becomes more 
mature, industry must find a way to attract consumer interest in order to ce-
ment demand both for Digital ID in general and interoperable ID platforms 
in particular.
Interoperability in Digital ID online has drawbacks that must be addressed, 
but has high potential to be generative as well. Digital ID interoperability 
could create new markets on at least two levels (competition for Digital ID 
itself and services built on top of a pervasive ID layer) and also enable interop-
erability among other applications and services. The incentives for market 
players are largely aligned at the moment, but may diverge as technological 
and market developments progress. The largest potential pitfall is a break-
down of collaboration among stakeholders. If those currently participating 
in the dialogue split off or throw support behind warring standards, user 
adoption will remain low, and little innovation will result. However, the cur-
rent market trajectory is promising, and we should see significant innovation 
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Computers interact with one another via the seven layers of the Open Sys-
tems Interconnection model (OSI), a framework that outlines the specifica-
tions, functions, and activities that occur in a computer network. The OSI 
model rests on the idea that the various tasks involved in communicating be-
tween two computers can be divided into distinct layers of related functions 
and activities. While many developers do not strictly adhere to the OSI model 
by keeping related functions in a clearly defined layer, the OSI model has 
been adopted as a standard by the ISO (International Organization for Stan-
dardization), and most networking products attempt to define themselves in 
relation to the OSI model. 
Today’s widespread use of computer networking has been enabled by the 
broad acceptance of protocols that define how computers will communicate 
with one another. Protocols are rules for communication (similar to languag-
es) and they exist at each of the levels in the communication connection. It 
is protocols that actually implement the functions and activities detailed in 
the OSI layers.
When  one  computer  sends  data  to  another,  the  message  begins  its  trip 
through the protocol stack at the Application Layer. The Application Layer is 
responsible for determining whether there are sufficient system resources on 
the sending computer to initiate communications. The Presentation Layer 
then ensures that the information will be sent in a format that is recognizable 
to the receiving machine. The Presentation Layer translates the data using 
the appropriate protocol so that it can be understood by an application on 
the receiving computer. The Presentation Layer is also the layer where data 
encryption or decryption is accomplished.
The Session Layer sends a service request establishing, and later terminating, 
communications between the two computers. The Session Layer is responsi-
ble for initiating the requests that will establish a communication connection 
between two computers. Once established, the Session Layer is responsible 
for managing and maintaining the communication session.
The Transport Layer is responsible for ensuring reliability and integrity of 
communications between two computers. TCP (Transport Control Protocol) 
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divides the message into packets before passing them onto the Network Layer. 
The packets may take different paths to the receiving computer and will not 
necessarily arrive in the order sent. On the receiving computer, TCP reas-
sembles the packets and requests that lost or damaged packets be resent. 
Internet Protocol (IP) governs Internet communications at the Network Lay-
er. Here, the addresses of the sending and receiving computers are added to 
the packet. A packet will wind its way to its final destination hopping from 
one computer to another. Computers along the way examine the addresses 
and decide where to direct the packet.
The Data Link Layer checks to see if any transmission errors occurred that 
changed the data inside the packet. It also manages communications within 
the internal networks of the respective sending and receiving computers. 
The Physical Layer takes the packet and generates the actual electrical signals 
that will transfer information from one computer to another. Once these 
signals are received, the data is decoded and unpacked until it is usable at the 
Application Layer on the receiving machine.